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## RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

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PSYCHOLOGIE DES WILLENS, zur Grundlegung der Ethik. Von HERMANN SCHWARZ. Leipzig: Engelmann, 1900. Pp. 391. M. 6.

THE twofold conviction, that no adequate moral philosophy can be constructed upon any other foundation than that of a thoroughgoing psychology of the will, and that such will-psychology has not yet been elaborated, constitutes the *raison d'être* of this treatise, as stated in the preface. The spontaneity of the subject in volition awaits that recognition and vindication which the spontaneity of the subject in cognition received at the hands of Kant. The point of departure, therefore, for the whole book, lies in the distinction between *Naturzwang* and *Normzwang*, as explained in the introductory chapter. Too often have ethical writers treated the volitional life as though there were no such thing as norm-law or norm-force in the realm of will, though all the while perfectly well aware of the reality of such norm-law in cognitive activity. The whole science of logic is an acknowledgment of the supremacy of ideal types in cognition; so ethics, with its psychological groundwork, should recognize and elaborate the doctrine of the norm or ideal in volition. Natural forces, instincts, impulses, and the like, must, of course, be reckoned with, but they are not the whole of the matter. *Der Mensch ist mehr als ein blosses Naturprodukt.*

In the first part of the work the shortcomings of materialism, hedonism, empiricism, and kindred doctrines are set forth. An act of volition is not a mere resultant of contending forces; nor is it determined by an idea, or a feeling, or by any complex of ideas and feelings, in and by themselves. How, then, is it determined? By the whole personality of the willing subject, in his capacity of analytic and synthetic choice, where *Normzwang* reigns supreme. The second part of the work is occupied with the explanation of these terms, analytic and synthetic choice or preference. The distinction between these is analogous to that which Kant has drawn between the analytic judgment and the synthetic, in the *Critique of the Pure Reason*. By analytic choice our author means the general direction of the human

will toward the good as such, apart from any more specific determination of that wherein the good consists. We will the being of the good, rather than its non-being; we prefer the non-being of the evil. All worth as such is preferred over all unworth as such. Had we, therefore, no other will-power than that of analytic choice, we should be obliged to wait until instructions should come from some extraneous source, with regard to *what* is good or bad, right or wrong, in any given case of contemplated action. This is perhaps the point at which Kant's ethical system fails of completeness. But now in synthetic preference the *content* of the good, as distinguished from its *form*, is made manifest in the free spontaneity of the choosing person, who in his act itself declares that the interests of personality by right take precedence over those of the circumstances and adjuncts of personality, and that the interests of the social whole (altruism) are to be preferred before those of merely individual incidence (egoism). Synthetic choice, it should be added, is directed to the *act* itself, rather than to the *object* of the act. "There is nothing good save a good will," as Kant said; but the good will is further defined as that which is directed to altruistic ends rather than egoistic, and to personal considerations in preference to circumstances or accessory conditions. So the possibility of ethics, one may say, depends upon that of synthetic choices *a priori*; even as, for Kant, the possibility of knowledge depends upon that of synthetic judgments *a priori*. How far the author has succeeded in avoiding the "circle" which has been charged upon Kant's ethical system, the reader must be left to judge.

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AVICENNE. Par LE BARON CARRA DE VAUX. Paris: Alcan, 1900.

Pp. viii + 304; map. Fr. 5.

THIS book is not simply an exposition of the system of Avicenna. It contains also a description of Muslim scholastic philosophy from its origin, and of the forces acting on it down to the time of the subject proper. This takes up the first 126 pages. Then comes a chapter on his life, and thereafter chapters on his system, under the rubrics: logic, physics, psychology, metaphysics, and mysticism.

For this long introduction there is ample excuse in the nature of the case. Very few, indeed, are prepared to take up immediately the life and theories of a Muslim of the fourth century of the Hijra and supply of themselves a knowledge of all that went to make him what